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TRADE, TAX AND TAKEOVERS — CAN THE EUROPEAN COURT
DE-REGULATE EUROPE DESPITE RESISTANCE FROM THE COUNCIL AND 
PARLIAMENT?1
Derrick Wyatt∗
Summary: Proposals by the Commission to remove barriers to cross-frontier business  
activity  seem  deadlocked  by  disagreement  in  the  Council  or  Parliament   (e.g.  Tax 
Harmonisation and the Services Directive) or doomed to produce European packaging  
for business as usual (e.g., the Takeover Directive). It is the Luxembourg Court which  
maintains  the  process  of  de-regulation,  and upholds  challenges  to  national  rules  on  
banking,  tax,  and  capital  structures,  which  operate  as  barriers  to  market  entry  and 
reduce  the  competitiveness  of  the  European  market.  For  those  who  believe  in  free  
markets, these contributions to a competitive  Europe are timely and positive.
This  lecture  advances  two  propositions.  The  first  concerns  the  European  Court’s 
contribution to a competitive European market. It falls to the Court to interpret the scope 
of the fundamental freedoms of establishment, service provision and capital movement. 
The Court’s approach in this respect has contributed positively to the high degree of 
competitiveness referred to in Article 2 of the EC Treaty. My second proposition is that 
the Community’s  political institutions, the Council and the Parliament,  have inhibited 
recent Commission initiatives to de-regulate the internal market, and improve its overall 
competitiveness. 
Perhaps the most significant case ever decided by the Court of Justice in the internal 
market field was the so-called Cassis case.2
Under German legislation fruit liqueurs such as "Cassis" could only be marketed if they contained 
a minimum alcohol content of 25 per cent., whereas the alcohol content of the French product in 
question was between 15 per cent and 20 per cent
The Court in this case, in 1979, laid down an important principle. It held that there was 
no valid reason why alcoholic beverages lawfully produced and marketed in one of the 
Member States,  should not be introduced into and placed on the market in any other 
Member State. A product which was good for the market  of one Member State,  was 
presumptively good for the markets of all Member States, unless there was an objectively 
justifiable reasons to the contrary. National rules which failed to respect this principle 
must be set aside by national courts.
1 This is the text of a lecture delivered to Oxford alumni in London on 23 rd May at the offices of Allen and 
Overy.
 Professor Derrick Wyatt QC, St Edmund Hall, Oxford
2 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649.
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The same principle was to be adopted for services, in Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd.3
The national proceedings arose from a legal action by a patent agent in Munich against a company 
incorporated in England and Wales. The plaintiff was a specialist in patent renewal services who 
claimed  that  the  provision  of  such  services  by  the  defendant  to  customers  in  Germany  was 
contrary to German rules reserving such activities exclusively to persons possessing the relevant 
professional qualification.
The Court held that the Treaty prohibited any national rule likely to impede the activities 
of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides 
similar services. A service product which is good for the market of one Member State, is 
presumptively good for the market  of all  Member States,  unless there are objectively 
justifiable reasons to the contrary.
In the latter case an English company lawfully providing services in the UK was held to 
be entitled to provide its services to customers in Germany. In a more recent case the 
Court allowed a service provider to challenge rules in its country of establishment, on the 
ground that  those  rules  prevented the  service  provider  from providing the  prohibited 
service to customers in other Member States.4 Swedish rules prohibited the advertising in 
publications of alcoholic beverages. The Court of Justice held that such a prohibition 
amounted to a restriction on the provision of services which would have to be justified. 
This was because (a) the prohibition restricted the right of publishers to offer advertising 
space  to  potential  advertisers  in  other  Member  States  and  (b)  the  prohibition  had  a 
particular effect on the cross border supply of advertising space, given the international 
nature  of  the  advertising  market  in  alcoholic  products.  This  judgment  shrinks  the 
distinction between inter-State transactions and purely internal  intra-State transactions 
almost to vanishing point.5
Good and services have something in common. They can originate in one Member State, 
yet be marketed in another. There is a kind of logic in allowing the rules of the state of 
origin to determine legal requirements relating to the essential characteristics of goods or 
services. The purchaser in one Member State of a good or service originating in another, 
is in a sense “shopping abroad”. The German consumer of French cassis could be said to 
be doing so. As could the German consumer of British patent renewal services. 
Businesses aiming to set up permanent establishments in other Member States seem at 
first sight to raise rather different issues. The aim of the out of state business is to become 
an in-state business. The guarantee essential to achieving that aim is the prohibition of 
discrimination  on  grounds  of  nationality.  Until  relatively  recently  it  appeared  that  a 
national  rule  could  only  amount  to  a  restriction  on  the  right  of  establishment  if  it 
discriminated, directly or indirectly against out of state businesses. 
3 Case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] ECR I – 4221.
4 C-405/98 Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I – 1755
5 As does Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter [2002] ECR I - 6279
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In  Commission v.  Belgium6 the  Commission  alleged  that  non-discriminatory  Belgian 
rules  governing the  activities  of  clinical  biology laboratories  were  incompatible  with 
Article 43 (ex 52). The Commission argued that the rules in question were excessively 
restrictive,  and that the latter Article prohibited not only discriminatory measures, but 
also  "measures  which  apply  to  both  nationals  and  foreigners  without  discrimination 
where they constitute an unjustified constraint for the latter.”7 The Court rejected this 
approach to the right of establishment. It emphasised that the text of Article 43 (ex 52) 
guaranteed equality of treatment for nationals and non-nationals, and stated:
“.. provided that such equality of treatment is respected, each Member State is, in the absence of 
Community rules in this area, free to lay down rules for its own territory governing the activities 
of laboratories providing clinical biology services.”8
This position was soon to change. In the Gebhard9 case the Court made it clear that any 
national  measure  which hindered  or  made less  attractive  the  exercise  of  the  right  of 
establishment, must be justified, whether discriminatory or not. While the Court adopted 
this  approach in  a  case  which  involved  the  right  of  establishment,  the  Court  used  a 
formulation which referred to the exercise of all fundamental freedoms.
“…national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfill four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be 
suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Case C-19/92 Kraus…., para. 32).10
This  approach  is  clearly  more  demanding  of  national  rules  than  a  mere  non-
discrimination requirement. One effect of the  Gebhard  formulation may be to create a 
presumption that a commercial operator carrying on business under certain conditions in 
its home state is entitled to extend its activities to another Member State under the same 
conditions. This is analogous to the weight which the Cassis and Säger principles give to 
the law of the Member State of origin of goods and service products.  
This proposition is demonstrated by the judgment in the now well known Centros case.11 
In  this  case  the  Court  treated  the  right  of  establishment  as  including  the  right  of  a 
company incorporated in one Member State to set up a branch in another, even if the 
company carried on no business at all in the Member State of incorporation, and did not 
comply with the minimum capital requirements of the Member State where the branch 
was established.
6 Case 221/85 Commission v. Belgium [1987] ECR 719.
7 Ibid., para. 5.
8 Ibid., para. 9. The Court confirmed this view of the scope of  freedom of establishment in Case 198/86 
Erwin Conradi and others v.  Direction de la Concurrence et des Prix des Hauts de Seine [1987] ECR 
4469.
9 Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] 
ECR I – 4165.
10 Ibid., para. 37.
11 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I – 1459.
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Danish nationals resident in Denmark and carrying  on business in Denmark set  up a 
limited liability company in England whose only business activities would be carried out 
by a branch in Denmark. The share capital of the English company was £100, and the 
sole reason the Danish nationals set up a company in the United Kingdom rather than 
Denmark, was to secure the advantages of limited liability without having to meet the 
cost of the £20,000 minimum capital requirement then prevailing in Denmark. When the 
Danish  nationals  sought  to  register  the  Danish  branch  of  the  company,  the  Danish 
authorities refused to do so, since that branch would be the principal establishment of the 
English company, which would do no business in the United Kingdom, and since the sole 
purpose of setting up the English company was the avoidance of Danish minimum capital 
requirements. The Danish authorities regarded the situation as in reality being internal to 
Denmark, but made it clear that they would have registered the branch if the company 
had been also carrying on business in the United Kingdom.
The Court in this case upheld two related aspects of the right of establishment. The first 
aspect was the right of a person who wished to set up a company to choose the Member 
State  whose  company  law was  the  least  restrictive.  The  second  aspect  was  for  that 
company to set up a branch in any other Member State. The Court rejected arguments 
that these features represented an abuse of the right of establishment – these features were 
“inherent in the exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed 
by the Treaty.”12 
It is not difficult to draw an analogy between Centros on the one hand, and Cassis  and 
Säger on the other. The analogy is to the effect that just as a good or service product 
produced in one Member State may in principle be marketed in any other Member State, 
so may a company incorporated in one Member State claim to be recognised as such in 
any other Member State. The analogy with Cassis was indeed part of the argument of the 
United Kingdom at the hearing in the Centros case. 
The presumption which may be created by the right of establishment to the effect that a 
commercial operator carrying on business under certain conditions in its home state is 
entitled  to  extend  its  activities  to  another  Member  State  under  the  same  conditions 
appears from other case law. In Pfeiffer Gro8handel13 an Austrian subsidiary of a German 
parent operating 139 discount stores in Austria wanted to use the trade name “Plus”. This 
was the trade name used by the German parent in its German stores, and German parent 
wished  to  extend  this  “own brand”  name to  its  stores  in  Austria.  Another  company 
claimed that  the  trade name infringed its  rights  to use a  similar  name, and sought  a 
restraining order. The Court referred to the Gebhard test and stated:
“A restraining order of the type sought by the plaintiff in the main proceedings operates to the 
detriment of undertakings whose seat is in another Member State where they lawfully use a trade 
name which they would like to use beyond the boundaries of that State. Such an order is liable to 
constitute an impediment to the realization by those undertakings of a uniform advertising concept 
12 Ibid., para. 27.
13 Case C-255/97 Pfeiffer Gro8handel Gmbh v. Lwa Warenahndel Gmbh [1999] ECR I – 2835.
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at Community level since it  may force them to adjust  the presentation of the businesses they 
operate according to the place of establishment.”14
The Court of Justice recognised that such a restriction might be  justified,  but what is 
significant is that the Court recognises as part of the right of establishment the right to 
realise a “uniform advertising concept at Community level”. What this right amounts to 
in a case such as Pfeiffer is the benefit of a presumption that the advertising concept used 
by the parent in the home State may be extended to other Member States, unless there is a 
good reason to the contrary.
One of the effects of the  Gebhard formulation may be to create a presumption that a 
commercial operator carrying on business under certain conditions in its home state is 
entitled to extend its activities under the same conditions to another Member State. But 
the  Gebhard  formulation  is  not  limited  to  such  an  affect  and  appears  to  allow  a 
commercial operator to challenge any national rule which hinders or makes less attractive 
the exercise of the right of establishment. The extent to which this allows out of state 
commercial operators to challenge allegedly unnecessary regulation is illustrated by the 
recent Caixa Bank case.15 This case concerned French rules prohibiting interest on ‘sight” 
current accounts. A French subsidiary of a Spanish bank wished to pay interest on its 
current accounts. It alleged that the French rules constituted a restriction on the freedom 
of establishment in so far as they applied to a subsidiary formed in France by a legal 
person registered in another Member State. The Court agreed:
12. A prohibition on the remuneration of sight accounts such as that laid down by the French 
legislation constitutes, for companies from Member States other than the French Republic, a 
serious obstacle to the pursuit of their activities via a subsidiary in the latter Member State, 
affecting their access to the market. That prohibition is therefore to be regarded as a restriction 
within the meaning of Article 43 EC. 
13. That prohibition hinders credit institutions which are subsidiaries of foreign companies in 
raising capital from the public, by depriving them of the possibility of competing more effectively, 
by paying remuneration on sight accounts, with the credit institutions traditionally established in 
the Member State of establishment, which have an extensive network of branches and therefore 
greater opportunities than those subsidiaries for raising capital from the public. 
14. Where credit institutions which are subsidiaries of foreign companies seek to enter the market 
of a Member State, competing by means of the rate of remuneration paid on sight accounts 
constitutes one of the most effective methods to that end. Access to the market by those 
establishments is thus made more difficult by such a prohibition.” 
The rule in issue in this case hinders the right of establishment because it reinforces 
barriers to market entry which are intrinsic to the banking sector – the existence of an 
extensive network of branches. What if the subsidiary of the out of state bank has a 
network of branches itself? It does not seem to be a precondition to challenging the 
national rule that the out of state bank actually be placed at a disadvantage by the 
14 Ibid., para. 20.
15 Case C-442/02 CaixaBank France, Judgment of 5 October 2004.
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national rule in question. In principle, the national rule reinforces barriers to market 
entry, and that seems to be enough for an out of state operator to challenge the rule.
A fundamental freedom closely linked to the right of establishment is the right to free 
movement  of capital.  The links are particularly  close when it  comes to acquiring 
shares in companies with a view to the exercise of managerial control. The Court has 
given  judgment  in  a  number  of  cases  involving  “special  shares”  held  by  public 
authorities in companies previously in public ownership. The shares were “special” in 
that they bestowed voting rights did not reflect any capital invested by the State, and 
in that the existence of the special shares was the direct or indirect consequence of 
national legislative measures. These special shares bestowed on the public authorities 
the right to veto certain acquisitions of shares in the company, and to veto certain 
decisions of the company. Of particular interest are those cases in which the existence 
or  exercise  of  the  special  share  rights  did  not  have  any  discriminatory  effects 
whatsoever. The Court held in one of the cases, Commission v. France16 that 
“Even though the rules in issue may not give rise to unequal treatment, they are liable to impede 
the acquisition of shares in the undertakings concerned and to dissuade investors in other Member 
States from investing in the capital of those undertakings.”
The Court’s reasoning is to the effect that an investor seeking to acquire a controlling 
stake in a company is likely to be dissuaded from doing so if a Member State retains 
special rights  to interfere in the management of the company by its directors. This 
comes  close  to  saying  that  regulation of  corporate  activities  per  se  amounts  to  a 
restriction on capital movement.
The Court’s case law on goods, services, establishment and capital movement has two 
effects. It removes obstacles to cross frontier economic activity. And it does so in a 
way which contributes to a high degree of competitiveness, since all that is necessary 
to show a restriction on cross frontier economic activity is a hindrance to the exercise 
of the economic activity itself. This case also tends to shrink the distinction between 
purely internal situations and cross frontier situations. Thus for example in the special 
shares cases, provisions in the  articles of association which gave state authorities 
special rights were held to amount restrictions on capital movement, since they were 
capable of dissuading potential investors from other Member States from investing in 
the companies in question. Yet they had no special propensity to hinder cross frontier 
activity. One effect of expanding the reach of the internal market is to increase the pro 
competitive effects of the Court’s case law.  A side effect  of this expansion is  an 
expansion  in  competence  of  the  Community  institutions  to  regulate  the  internal 
market under, inter alia, Article 95 EC.
A feature of the right of establishment and of capital movement which has attracted 
increasing attention has been its impact on the application of national tax rules. Tax 
lawyers came late in the day to the implications of the internal market for national tax 
rules. Of all the cases involving national tax provisions heard by the Court between 
16 Case C-483/99 Commission v. France [2002] ECR – 4781, para. 41.
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1990 and 2000, two thirds of the cases dated from the last three years of that period.17 
Aspects  of  national  tax law hitherto  regarded as  the  reasonable corollaries  of  the 
territorial scope of the tax systems, have increasingly been regarded by the European 
Court  as  hindering  the  exercise  of  fundamental  freedoms  or  discriminating  on 
grounds of nationality. UK rules depriving a resident company of consortium relief 
because of the inclusion of a certain proportion of non resident companies in the 
consortium  have  been  held  to  hinder  the  right  of  establishment.18 French  rules 
automatically subjecting unrealised capital gains to tax, when a taxpayer transfers his 
tax residence to another Member State, have also been held to amount to a restriction 
on the right of establishment.19 And “thin capitalisation” rules, applying to loans by 
out of state parent companies  to their subsidiaries, but not to loans by resident parent 
companies, have been held to discriminate on grounds of nationality.20 The effect of 
Court’s case law in this area as in others is market liberalising, or potentially so. I 
would  maintain  this  to  be  the  case  even  though in  certain  cases  the  response  of 
Member States has been to respond to the Court’s case law by extending to internal 
situations tax regimes hitherto reserved for cross frontier situations. And even though 
one  of  the aims of  the Court  of  Justice  might  well  be to encourage measures  of 
harmonisation.21
My thesis tonight is that the case law of the European Court has been and continues to 
be  a  liberalising  force  which  should  be  welcomed  and  supported  by  those  who 
consider free markets to make a substantial contribution to the public good. 
But there is a second element in my thesis. It is that the Council and Parliament are 
not playing the positive role which they might. The Commission has never been more 
liberal, in the economic sense. This is not a comment simply or mainly on the Barroso 
Commission. The evolution of the pro market attitudes of the Commission certainly 
predates the present Commission, and has affected the Commission’s approach to the 
content  of  internal  market  legislation  which  it  has  proposed  for  adoption  to  the 
Council  and  European  Parliament  in  order  to  facilitate  exercise  of  the  right  of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services.
In  this  connection  it  should  be  recalled  that  the  legal  basis  of  company  law 
harmonisation in the EC Treaty is the chapter on establishment. The decision of the 
European Commission to appoint a High Level Group of Company Law Experts to 
advise  on  proposals  for  company  law harmonisation  has  ensured  that  subsequent 
17 Wathelet,  The  Influence  of  Free  Movement  of  Persons,  Services  and  Capital  on  National  Direct  
Taxation:Trends in the Case Law of the Court of Justice, 20 YEL (2001) 1, p. 32.
18 Case C-264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her Majesty's Inspector  
of Taxes) [1998] ECR I – 4695.
19 Case C-9/02 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie 
Judgment of 11 March 2004.
20 Case C-324/00 Lankhorst –Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt [2002] ECR I – 11779.
21 Judge Melchior Wathelet (reporting judge in numerous tax cases) wrote: “It may be that, if there is a 
continuing increase in the number of cases brought, either before the Court of Justice or before the national 
courts, that will force the Member States to accelerate moves towards a harmonisation of national laws” 
(2001 YEL, p. 33).
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Commission proposals have taken account of the views of business and have aimed to 
adjust company law to facilitate the right of cross frontier establishment, not simply 
to create interesting hybrid company law. The First Report of the High Level Group 
of Experts Group was on the proposed Take-over Directive. The Second Report was 
on  “A Modern  Regulatory Framework for  Company Law in  Europe”.  This  latter 
report  was  presented  in  November  2002.  Its  values  are  unequivocally  the  new 
European values of competitiveness, and empiricism, combined with a methodology 
which emphasises transparency and consultation. 
Council and Parliament failed to adopt the Take-over Directive in the form advocated 
by the Commission.  In the form proposed by the Commission the directive would 
have had distinctive pro market and pro competitive features. In the first place the 
directive prohibited action by the board of a target company to frustrate a bid without 
the prior authorisation of the general meeting. In the second place multiple voting 
rights and restrictive voting arrangements would not have had effect at any general 
meeting  authorising  defensive  measures.  Such  a  Directive  would  have  improved 
competitiveness in the internal market by preventing self-serving defensive measures 
by company boards. But pressure from certain Member States led to these provisions 
of the Take-over Directive being considerably weakened.22 It is possible for example 
for  Member States to opt  out  of  the rules  on defensive measures/voting rights  in 
Articles  9  and  11  of  the  Directive.  Yet  companies  in  those  Member  States  may 
nevertheless opt into the regime of Articles 9/11. And Member States may authorise 
companies  not  to  apply  Articles  9/11  if  they  are  the  subject  of  a  takeover  by  a 
company which does not  apply that  regime. So in countries which apply Articles 
9/11, target companies cannot frustrate bids by home companies, but may be entitled 
to frustrate bids by companies subject to the law of a Member State which has opted 
out of Articles 9/11, unless the company in question has opted into the latter regime! 
The Commission’s proposal was for a European wide take-over regime that would 
have made for  a  more competitive  Europe.  It  was  modified  into a  regime which 
allows Member States to adopt protectionist opt outs which are hard to reconcile with 
the aims and scope of the chapter on establishment.
This example – of a Commission proposal for improvement of the internal market 
being undermined by Member States and/or the European Parliament - is not isolated. 
The proposal for a directive on services in the internal market23 is a good model of 
how internal market legislation should be conceived, developed and formulated. The 
need for the legislation is based on empirical rather than speculative or theoretical 
grounds.24 
22 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 april 2004 on takeover bids, 
OJ L108/38.
23 COM(2004) 2 final/3; Council document 5161/05 of 10 January 2005.
24 See the Commission report on “The State of the Internal Market for Services” COM (2002) 441 final, 
30.7.2002. In its “subsidiarity” evaluation, the Commission states that “The obstacles in question have been 
clearly  identified  on  the  basis  of  complaints,  petitions  and  questions  from  the  European  Parliament, 
consultation of interested parties, and studies or analyses.”
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The scheme  of  the  directive  as  regards  establishment  provides  for  administrative 
simplification. It lays down a presumption against the need for authorisation schemes 
unless objectively justified.25
The scheme of the directive for provision of services places reliance on the origin 
principle.  This  is  the  principle  that  services  be in  principle  be regulated by their 
“home State”.26
Harmonisation of standards is kept to a minimum and targeted.27 Codes of conduct at 
Community level are advocated in circumstances where in the past harmonisation 
might have been preferred.28 Voluntary policies on the quality of services and charter 
marks are similarly advocated.29
The  provisions  of  the  directive  as  regards  both  establishment  and  services  are 
significantly influenced by the case law of the Court of Justice, and in a number of 
respects  the  directive  is  declaratory  of  the  effects  of  directly  effective  treaty 
provisions  on  establishment  and services.  This  is  light  touch  regulation  aimed at 
deregulation.  It  is  a  logical  step  towards  implementation  of  the  so-called  Lisbon 
agenda, and was indeed described by the Commission as a relaunch of this agenda. 
Yet is has proved in some quarters highly controversial. In particular aspects of the 
directive have been strongly criticised by the governments of several large Member 
States. What is particularly worthy of remark in this respect is that criticisms of this 
directive appear to call in question basic treaty principles, as those principles have 
been interpreted by the European Court of Justice. 
My final example of the Court and Commission being rather more enthusiastic than 
national governments about removing barriers in the internal market,  is in the tax 
field.  With few exceptions, the Court’s case law on fundamental  freedoms versus 
national  tax  rules  rightly  identifies  unjustifiable  restrictions  on  cross  frontier 
economic  activity.  Objections  to  this  case  law  are  largely  objections  by  national 
finance ministries concerned at erosion of the national tax base. There is room to 
argue that the case law of the Court has in one or two cases given insufficient weight 
to  the  need  to  allow derogations from fundamental  freedoms in  the  interest  of  a 
mandatory requirement which has come to be described as the “cohesion of the tax 
system”30 (or in analogous arguments for derogation). I would say for example that if 
the Court of Justice were to accept the contention of the taxpayer  in the national 
proceedings in Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer v.  David Halsey (HM Inspector of  
Taxes), this would be a step too far. This might not, admittedly, be the case if the 
Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Maduro  were  accepted  by  the  Court.  But  the 
25 Articles 9 and 10.




30 The principle was applied in Case C-204/90 Bachmann, [1992] ECR I – 249, but has been construed very 
narrowly in subsequent cases, as have analogous arguments, see e.g., Case C-264/96  Imperial Chemical  
Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) [1998] ECR I – 4695, paras. 
28 and 29.
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fundamental  problem with the argument  advanced by the taxpayer  in  Marks and 
Spencer is with the proposition that one Member State should be obliged to give relief 
for losses incurred in another Member State in respect of activities falling wholly 
outside the tax competence of the first Member State.31
 Whether  or  not   the Court  of Justice  might  in certain cases have failed to have 
sufficient  regard  for  the  “cohesion”  of  the  national  tax  systems,  the  concern  of 
national finance ministries that the Court’s case law is eroding and will continue to 
erode the national tax base is a legitimate concern. But it is a concern which can be 
addressed. It can be addressed by unilateral modification of tax rules, in some cases 
by  double  tax  conventions,  and  it  can  more  ambitiously  be  addressed  by  the 
Community institutions adopting harmonisation measures via Article 94 of the EC 
Treaty. The Commission’s position is to pursue the long term aims of (a) a common 
tax base and (b) home state taxation for small and medium sized enterprises. 
While in theory a common tax base is about the best cause the European law maker 
could  champion  in  the  tax  field,  consensus  might  only  be  possible  via  enhanced 
cooperation on the part of certain but not all Member States. 
Qualified majority voting in the tax field is legally out of the question, now and under 
the draft Constitution, and would be disastrous in policy terms because some Member 
States  would  seek  to  impose  high  minimum  rates  of  corporation  tax,  and  thus 
undermine the overall competitiveness of the EU. But Member States which want a 
competitive  low  tax  Europe  should  not  regard  any  tax  harmonisation  as  bad 
harmonisation. A common tax base, negotiated by unanimity to safeguard national 
fiscal sovereignty, could produce policy gains for Member States, and a reduction in 
arbitrary  tax  penalties  for  companies  extending  their  businesses  across  national 
frontiers. 
The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, which had its first 
meeting in November 2004, continues to meet. But at the outset two Member States 
indicated that a distinction was to be drawn between technical participation and the 
political aspects of the common tax base project. The two Member States in question 
remained politically opposed to a common tax base. The possibility that progress at 
the technical level might lead to modification of political positions cannot be ruled 
out. And adoption in the future of a common tax base by some Member States via the 
procedure of enhanced cooperation seems a distinct possibility.
It might be said that lawyers should confine their criticisms of lawmakers and judges 
to the technical aspects of the work of both. But in the field of European law, as in 
many national fields of law, a hard and fast line between legal reasoning and principle 
on the one hand, and policy and politics on the other, is not easy to draw. It is in that 
spirit  that  I  venture  the modest  conclusion,  that  the contribution of  the European 
Court of Justice to a Europe of personal freedom of movement, and indeed to a more 
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competitive Europe, has been distinctive, and enduring. It is to be hoped that at least 
the principal elements of that contribution prove irreversible.
